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Abstract
Background: Among swine, reassortment of influenza virus genes from birds, pigs, and humans could generate influenza viruses
with pandemic potential. Humans with acute infection might also be a source of infection for swine production units. This article
describes the study design and methods being used to assess influenza A transmission between swine workers and pigs. We
hypothesize that transmission of swine influenza viruses to humans, transmission of human influenza viruses to swine, and
reassortment of human and swine influenza A viruses is occurring. The project is part of a Team Grant; all Team Grant studies
include active surveillance for influenza among Hutterite swine farmers in Alberta, Canada. This project also includes non-
Hutterite swine farms that are experiencing swine respiratory illness.
Methods/Design: Nurses conduct active surveillance for influenza-like-illness (ILI), visiting participating communally owned and
operated Hutterite swine farms twice weekly. Nasopharyngeal swabs and acute and convalescent sera are obtained from
persons with any two such symptoms. Swabs are tested for influenza A and B by a real time RT-PCR (reverse transcriptase
polymerase chain reaction) at the Alberta Provincial Laboratory for Public Health (ProvLab). Test-positive participants are
advised that they have influenza. The occurrence of test-positive swine workers triggers sampling (swabbing, acute and
convalescent serology) of the swine herd by veterinarians. Specimens obtained from swine are couriered to St. Jude Children's
Research Hospital, Memphis, TN for testing. Veterinarians and herd owners are notified if animal specimens are test-positive
for influenza. If swine ILI occurs, veterinarians obtain samples from the pigs; test-positives from the animals trigger nurses to
obtain specimens (swabbing, acute and convalescent serology) from the swine workers. ProvLab cultures influenza virus from
human specimens, freezes these cultures and human sera, and ships them to St. Jude where sera will be examined for antibodies
to swine and human influenza virus strains or reassortants. Full length sequencing of all eight genes from the human and swine
influenza isolates will be performed so that detailed comparisons can be performed between them.
Discussion: The declaration of pandemic influenza in June 2009, caused by a novel H1N1 virus that includes avian, swine and
human genes, highlights the importance of investigations of human/swine influenza transmission.
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Background
The reassortment of genes from influenza viruses from
different animal species circulating within pigs is thought
to be one mechanism for the development of influenza
viruses with pandemic potential [1]. Although the host
range restriction of influenza viruses is a polygenic trait,
the haemagglutinin (HA) glycoprotein is critical as it is
responsible for viral attachment to the sialic acid receptors
on the host cell surface. While human and avian viruses
differ in the nature of the sialic acid receptors they prefer,
both avian and human influenza viruses can infect pigs
because porcine cells in the respiratory tract express the
linkages for both human and avian strains [2]. In both the
United States and Canada since 1998, triple reassortant
H3N2 influenza viruses containing human, classical
swine, and avian virus lineage genes have been isolated
from pigs [3,4]. In Canada, both wholly human H1N2
and human-swine reassortant H1N2 viruses have been
recovered from pigs from the province of Ontario [3]. A
reassortant H1N1 virus of a unique genotype not previ-
ously seen in pigs that contained genes of classical swine
virus lineages as well as a polymerase gene of a human
virus lineage polymerase was also found, suggesting that
co-infection and reassortment are occurring [3,5]. Trans-
mission of influenza between humans and swine is
known to occur, although the frequency of such occur-
rence is not well understood [6]. There may also be signif-
icant economic and production consequences to
influenza virus infection in naïve commercial swine
herds; therefore cross species infection is also of concern
to veterinarians and agricultural producers from an eco-
nomic and animal health perspective. A better under-
standing of the transmission of influenza between
humans and swine is thus important, and will have impli-
cations for pandemic preparedness, particularly in light of
the recently declared influenza A (H1N1) 2009 pandemic
[7]. An ideal population in which to study this would be
one in which humans, swine and poultry exist in close
proximity. To this end, we describe a unique Canadian
model, a study of influenza transmission on Hutterite col-
onies.
Why Hutterites?
The Hutterites live on communally owned and operated
farms (colonies). These colonies commonly raise swine
and are relatively isolated from towns and cities. This
combination of isolation from the larger Canadian popu-
lation plus intensive within-colony social contact may
facilitate influenza transmission within the colony, while
relatively reducing re-introduction of the virus from the
wider community. In contrast to most other swine farm-
ers, Hutterite colonies usually also raise poultry and
domestic waterfowl, are located under major wildfowl fly-
ways, and their lands include ponds and dugouts that are
attractive to wildfowl and are frequently used as a source
of water for the colony livestock operations. This makes
Hutterite farms uniquely desirable sites for studying inter-
species transmission of influenza viruses, including detec-
tion of subtypes not commonly seen in humans (H4, H5,
H7, H9), but potentially circulating among poultry and
domestic and wild waterfowl [8]. In 2006, a Hutterite
child in Alberta was hospitalized with respiratory symp-
toms that were subsequently shown to be due to influenza
A [9]. This was a novel H3N2 strain closely related to a
human/classic swine/avian triple reassortant strain previ-
ously isolated in Ontario [5,9]. This suggested to us that
there would be interest in the Hutterite community in par-
ticipating in a study of influenza transmission that
included both people and pigs.
The Hutterites
Hutterites are members of a Protestant sect founded as
part of the 16th century Anabaptist movement. In the
nineteenth century, they immigrated as a group to Canada
and the United States [10,11]; where at the present time
some three quarters of the colonies are in Canada. In Can-
ada, there are 30,665 Hutterites [12] living on 341 colo-
nies [13]. Nearly all Canadian Hutterites (98.5%) live in
the Canadian prairie provinces (Alberta 48.9%, Manitoba
30.7%, Saskatchewan 18.8%) [12]. Eight to 12 families
comprise the estimated 90 - 100 persons who live on each
colony [13-15]. Colonies have their own one-room
schools.
Although property is communally owned, colony mem-
bers live within nuclear families, with each family living
within a separate unit of a 'row house' [15,16]. Meals are
taken communally in a central dining hall, and men,
women and children eat separately [17,18]. Gender roles
and the hierarchy on Hutterite colonies are thought to be
divinely ordained; older people have authority over
younger and men over women [19]. Men and women
engage in separate work, with women being limited to
"family, domestic and food preparation jobs" [10]; while
men engage in farm production and farm operations
[10,20]. Schooling for Hutterite children generally ends at
age 15 years [18] and young men serve as apprentices for
about two years, acting as a mobile labour force within the
colony [10].
The gender distribution among Hutterites is similar to
that of other Canadians [21,22]; however, the Hutterite
population is younger: 5.1% aged 65 years or older in
contrast to 13.0% of the Canadian population, or 10.4%
of the Alberta population [21,22]. The Hutterite popula-
tion also has a higher fertility rate than Canadians gener-
ally. In recent years the fertility rate for Canadians,
generally, has ranged between 1.51 and 1.54 children per
woman [23]. However, although declining in recent years,BMC Public Health 2009, 9:420 http://www.biomedcentral.com/1471-2458/9/420
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the corresponding rate for Hutterite women is 6.29, and
the average family size in the order of 5 [20,24].
Hutterites are active swine farmers, owning more than one
third of all of the pigs in Alberta and Saskatchewan [25]
and about 40% of those in Manitoba [26]. The farrow-to-
finish hog production system (i.e., all phases of hog pro-
duction from breeding to growing the pigs to market
weight) is frequently used. A typical operation has 300 -
600 sows and produces 6,000 - 13,000 pigs annually [25].
Hutterite farmers are efficient and produce a dispropor-
tionately large amount of agricultural produce [27,28].
On a typical colony there will be a pig-boss [10], and there
may be 2 - 10 workers (including mobile "apprentices")
who work in the hog barns (J. Keenliside, personal com-
munication, July 2007).
Study Purpose and Objectives
The 'Flu Zoonotic' study (Zoonotic transmission of Influ-
enza A: swine & swine workers) is one of six studies that
comprise a Team Grant funded by the Canadian Institutes
of Health Research (Program: Pandemic Preparedness -
Influenza Transmission and Prevention). It is conducted
in the province of Alberta. The major goals of the Team
Grant are to:
￿ Develop a better understanding of the natural his-
tory of influenza
￿ Investigate determinants of successful influenza
immunization, and to
￿ Gain a better understanding of influenza transmis-
sion and its prevention in the community.
The objective of the "Flu Zoonotic" study is to assess influ-
enza A transmission between swine workers and pigs. We
will determine whether serological evidence of influenza
A virus exists in either swine or humans. We will assess if
swine to human/human to swine transmission of influ-
enza A (human virus, swine virus, reassortants) is occur-
ring and will characterize the swine influenza viruses that
infect humans and swine. We hypothesize that transmis-
sion of swine influenza viruses (SwIV) to humans, trans-
mission of human influenza viruses (HuIV) to swine, and
that reassortment of human and swine influenza A viruses
is occurring.
Methods/Design
This is a prospective cohort study conducted on Hutterite
colonies ("surveillance farms") in Alberta, Canada, where
ongoing surveillance for influenza is conducted among
humans and their swine. The occurrence of illness among
humans triggers swine testing, similarly, the occurrence of
illness among swine triggers human testing.
Surveillance farms
Each fall baseline sera and information is collected on
human participants and on the swine herd. A nurse
administered structured interview is used to collect base-
line information from participating colony members,
including age, medical history, influenza immunization
including receipt of the 1976 swine flu vaccine, and previ-
ous and current exposure to swine. A veterinarian obtains
a standardized herd history from the pig boss, including a
descriptor of the type of operation (e.g., farrow-to-finish,
farrow-to-wean, grow/finish etc.), closed vs. open herd,
number of sources from which pigs are introduced (for
open herds); total herd size and size by herd segment
(sows, gilts, growers, finishers, nursery pigs/weaners),
swine vaccination history, history of prior influenza in
herd; history of other swine respiratory diseases in herd,
whether or not poultry or water fowl are raised on the
farm, and a detailed checklist of on-farm biosecurity prac-
tices.
The surveillance period for this study is defined on the
basis of data from the Alberta wide human influenza sur-
veillance program [29], focusing on sentinel sites that are
in the geographic area that includes the participating Hut-
terite colonies. It begins when ≥1 nasopharygneal or
throat swab specimens received by ProvLab are positive
for influenza A and B viruses for two consecutive weeks.
Surveillance stops once there have been two consecutive
weeks of no positive influenza A or B patients detected in
these areas. Nurses visit each participating colony twice
weekly during the surveillance period and take nasopha-
ryngeal swabs (placed in Universal Transport Medium -
UTM) plus acute and convalescent blood samples from
those who have experienced 2 or more symptoms from a
close ended checklist (fever [≥ 380 Celsius], cough, nasal
congestion, sore throat, headache, sinus problems, mus-
cle aches, fatigue, ear ache or infection, chills). Among
those classified as swine workers (at least one hour per
week spent in swine barns), a detailed history of exposure
to poultry and birds and related work practices including
on farm biosecurity practices is obtained if any polymer-
ase chain reaction (PCR) test is positive for influenza A. If
two or more swine workers on the colony have symptoms
within a 72 hour period, nasopharyngeal swabs (flock
nasopharyngeal and flock nasal swabs) and blood speci-
mens (acute and convalescent) from all swine workers on
the colony are obtained. The respiratory samples are
immediately tested by real time RT-PCR for influenza A
and B virus and the virus is also cultured from positive
samples at ProvLab. If any samples are test positive, spec-
imens are collected from a sample of pigs from the same
colony. In the event that influenza is identified in the pigs,
the study nurse administers a questionnaire and collects
specimens (flocked nasal and nasopharyngeal swab for
influenza A, acute and convalescent blood samples takenBMC Public Health 2009, 9:420 http://www.biomedcentral.com/1471-2458/9/420
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3 weeks apart) from all of the swine workers on the
affected colony, whether or not they are symptomatic.
At each twice weekly colony visit, nurses also inquire of
the pig bosses if there has been any swine illness. Herd
veterinarians also look for evidence of influenza during
their routine barn visits and telephone consultations with
the pig boss. If there has been swine illness, the nurse or
veterinarian notifies an investigator (JK or MLR) who
alerts a study veterinarian to investigate the illness. If the
study veterinarian suspects swine respiratory illness/swine
influenza, based on symptoms of one or more of: fever,
sneezing, cough, huddling, loss of appetite (decreased
feed consumption), stunted growth (i.e., pigs in the same
pen visibly vary in size and shape) or increased mortality
with or without cough; he/she makes a site visit to the
farm. The veterinarian takes samples from 30 pigs includ-
ing those that are most overtly ill, sampling from each age
group. Samples include Dacron® nasal swabs and 2 blood
samples (3 weeks apart) for acute and convalescent serol-
ogy from at least 24 pigs and lung tissue from up to 6 pigs.
This tissue is obtained from on-farm post-mortem after
the pigs have been purchased from the farmer and eutha-
nized. In the event of illness in a pig worker and the
absence of clinical disease in swine, only nasal swabs and
blood samples for acute and convalescent serology are
collected from 30 pigs. Swabs are placed in standard virus
transport medium. Lung samples are to be collected from
each pig, divided in half; placing one half in a tube con-
taining RNAlater® (Ambion) medium and the other half
(for PCR testing and virus culture) in virus transport
medium. Specimens are immediately placed in field cool-
ers with appropriate gel packs for transport.
Outbreak farms
This component is done 12 months of the year and best
considered as a "snap-shot". It was added to the protocol
in 2008 when additional funding (Alberta Livestock and
Meat Agency) became available to increase the number of
herds from which samples could be obtained, thus
increasing the likelihood of isolating the viruses of inter-
est. Community veterinarians, when called to attend
swine illness on farms that are not enrolled in the surveil-
lance cohort (regardless of whether or not the farmers are
Hutterites), inform the producers of our study and invite
them to participate. If the producer consents, the veteri-
narian obtains the standardized herd history and collects
samples as per the occurrence of swine illness on surveil-
lance farms. A study nurse is called and obtains consent to
participation from farm workers. A history is obtained
and nasopharyngeal swabs plus blood samples taken (3
weeks apart) for acute and convalescent serology.
Veterinarians and farm visits
The veterinarians for this study include one investigator
and community veterinarians within the geographic study
area. Whenever possible these are the veterinarians who
usually provide services to the participating farms. Many
have specialized swine practices. We chose as much as
possible to use those veterinarians with whom the farmers
had already established relationships, to build trust with
both farmers and the local veterinary community. For
those farms that do not have a usual attending veterinar-
ian, we have a listing of participating community veteri-
narians within the geographic area from which farmers
may select a practitioner. All veterinarians respect farm-
specific biosecurity requirements, including minimum
intervals specified by farmer since visits to other swine
barns.
Specimen transport
Human swabs and sera are sent to ProvLab using the usual
regional health authority transportation system for
human specimens. Swabs are tested for influenza A and B
using real time RT-PCR testing. The nurses are told by tel-
ephone if the sample is positive for influenza, and in turn
notify positive participants that they have influenza. Virus
is cultured and frozen, and the cultures and sera tran-
shipped to St. Jude Children's Research Hospital (Mem-
phis, TN) for batch analysis.
The transportation system for animal specimens was
developed specifically for this study and pilot tested in
2007 - 2008. Although the use of viral transport medium
should ensure that virus will maintain viability under
refrigeration, we pre-tested the effect of transportation
procedures on virus viability by using a sample of viable
human influenza virus in virus transport medium (pro-
vided by ProvLab) in 2 pre-tests (including courier to
Memphis and culture in Memphis).
Animal specimens are shipped by overnight courier to the
World Health Organization Collaborating Center for
Studies on the Ecology of Influenza in Animals and Birds
(St Jude). Swabs and lung tissue are tested for influenza
using real time RT-PCR and the veterinarians and pig
owners/pig bosses informed if tests are positive for influ-
enza.
Laboratory analyses
At St. Jude, animal specimens that are positive for influ-
enza A by real time RT-PCR are cultured on Madin Darby
canine kidney cells and in 10-day-old embryonated chick-
ens' eggs according to the published guidelines of the
World Health Organization [30]. Nucleotide sequences of
the full-length coding regions of all 8 RNA segments from
each virus will be determined by direct cycle sequencing
with previously described techniques and primers [31-BMC Public Health 2009, 9:420 http://www.biomedcentral.com/1471-2458/9/420
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33]. Human sera (batched and frozen at -80 degrees Cel-
sius and shipped annually to Memphis) and pig sera will
be tested for antibodies to the anticipated human influ-
enza A strain for the season such as, for the 2007-2008
season, A/Solomon Islands/3/2006 (H1N1) and A/Wis-
consin/67/2005 (H3N2); and for the swine strains that
are known to be recently circulating in Canada [e.g. A/
Swine/Ontario/33853/05 (H3N2) - like; A/Swine/N
Carolina/18161/02 (classical H1N1 - like)] as well as to a
more recent isolate with human-like H1 gene, A/Swine/
North Carolina/24848-1/05). Microneutralization assay
will be used to test human and swine serum samples for
antibodies to H4, H5, H7, and H9 influenza viruses due
to the assays' increased sensitivities and specificity over
hemagglutination inhibition assays [32] according to the
WHO recommended procedures [30]. The specific anti-
gens to be used will be selected from ongoing virologic
surveillance in duck populations in Alberta [33].
Serological evidence of transmission of SwIV/reassortants
to swine workers will be defined as antibodies to one or
more of the swine strains or reassortants with a titre > 1/
40 [34]. This is valid only for classical swine H1N1 virus
in human sera collected before April 2009, as, due to
shared epitopes, there may be cross reactivity on serologi-
cal tests between endemic human and swine strains,
including the new pandemic influenza strain. Evidence
for transmission of other swine strains/reassortants will
require culture from the swine workers. Serological evi-
dence of transmission of HuIV/reassortants to pigs is
strongest if there is an eightfold or higher increase in titre
between acute and convalescent serum samples to con-
temporary human H3N2 and H1N1 viruses. Further evi-
dence of transmission from human to pig is the isolation
of these human strains from pigs, the strongest evidence
obtained from comparison of the full length sequences
showing that the same strains are isolated from both
humans and animals.
Ethics
We do not do virus subtyping or sequencing or serological
analyses in real time. All samples are shipped to laborato-
ries under code and all testing done in an anonymized
fashion to preclude linkage of results to a specific farm
and is done at periodic intervals such that evidence of
infection would be historical (i.e., sufficient time would
have passed since specimen collection that any infection
events would be over, precluding the need for any public
health action). This is required to abate concerns that
study herds would be quarantined or depopulated or the
market value of the swine from the colony or the Alberta
swine industry, generally, be adversely impacted by test
results. This study was approved by the Conjoint Health
Research Ethics Board of the University of Calgary (Ethics
ID 18970), McMaster University HHS/FHS Research Eth-
ics Board (REB project # 07-376), and the University of
Calgary Animal Care Committee (Protocol M07107).
Discussion
The circulating H1N1 2009 pandemic strain of influenza
is thought to have reassorted within swine [35]. The first
isolation of the pandemic strain from swine occurred on
an Alberta farm [36] that had been targeted for inclusion
as an "outbreak farm" under this study protocol. The
infection of the pigs on this farm and farms elsewhere by
the pandemic strain is thought to be the result of human
to pig transmission [37]. This highlights the importance
of this study and of global surveillance of influenza trans-
mission between humans and pigs.
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